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1.

INTRODUCTION
Around the world, people face increasing responsibility for financial decisions that will

directly impact their long term financial wellbeing (Ryan et al. 2011). People with limited
financial literacy confront complicated choices over credit, mortgages, investments, and
retirement plans (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011). In theory, the expert advice garnered from
financial advisers should help consumers make sound decisions (Hackethal et al. 2012).
However, empirical research shows that better outcomes are not guaranteed. While some papers
show that advice improves portfolios, others find that financial advisers give poor counsel or
bolster client’s biases or mistakes (Anagol et al. 2017; Bergstresser et al. 2009; Chalmers and
Reuter 2015; Hackethal and Inderst 2013; Inderst and Ottaviani 2009, 2012a, b; Mullainathan et
al. 2012). As a result, it is not surprising that people find it difficult to distinguish good advice
from bad, and consequently, good advisers from bad advisers (Agnew et al. 2018). In this study,
we take a deeper look at how and why clients’ evaluations of advisers evolve over time, and we
also explore the monetary consequences of the behavioral biases that influence their assessments.
New research demonstrates how easily advisers can manipulate consumers into following
them by making good first impressions and confirming prior beliefs. However these studies do
not address whether these actions have economic consequences nor do they identify the type and
proportion of consumers who are most susceptible to these strategies (Agnew et al. 2018).
Therefore, the magnitude of this phenomenon and whether, in turn, this is a cause for concern is
not clear. Using new experimental data and adapting a new theoretical learning model, this paper
addresses these important unanswered questions. It also contributes to the literature by
highlighting the widespread and significant economic role first impressions and confirmation
bias can play in the financial advice market. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to measure
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how these biases can evolve over time and transform a consumer’s willingness to pay for
advisers.
Our study implements and tests the limited memory learning model in a new, financial
context. Until now, the learning model has only been tested using experiments that examine how
participants interpret information about two policy issues. In our study, clients must learn about
the quality of the advisers through the quality of the advice given. Our results show that the
limited memory model can explain features of financial decisions that conventional models
cannot, such as the persistent and unwarranted trust that some clients place in financial advisers
(ASIC 2012; Mullainathan et al. 2012).
The paper is structured as follows. We begin this paper in Section 2 by discussing
learning models and their relationship to confirmation bias. Section 3 follows with a description
of the market for financial advice. Section 4 presents a formal model drawn from Fryer et al.
(forthcoming) that incorporates confirmation bias and compares it to a rational updating model.
Section 5 presents our experimental design. Our empirical results are highlighted in Section 6
followed by a discussion of the findings in Section 7 to conclude the paper.

2.

CONSUMER LEARNING AND CONFIRMATION BIAS
Consumers frequently make decisions with incomplete information. As a result, learning is

best understood not as a simple collection of knowledge, but as a hypothesis-testing process
where new information is encoded and integrated with existing beliefs (Hoch and Deighton
1989). A prime example is when clients have to decide whether to follow financial advice in an
area where they have little experience, such as how to invest retirement savings. Clients who
have incomplete information will usually rely on signals to reach a decision about the quality of
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an adviser. For example, clients might rely on an adviser’s professional certification, consider
advice given on a different topic from the adviser before, or rely on other people’s opinions of
the quality of the different advisers. All of these signals help clients form an initial belief. New
signals and added experience then help them update these beliefs until they can make betterinformed decisions. The need to update beliefs formed with incomplete information is common
to many situations, such as when consumers purchase for the first time in an unknown product
category, when voters choose between two political candidates, when doctors have to choose
between two alternative treatments, or, as in the example above, when clients have to decide
whether to continue to trust their financial advisers.
People, however, rarely update their beliefs in a rational way. Instead they tend to interpret
evidence “in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand”
(Nickerson 1998) and tend to search harder for information that confirms their beliefs
(Muthukrishnan 1995; Snyder and Swann 1978), labelled “confirmation bias”. Confirmation
bias has proven to be a robust phenomenon in areas as diverse as beliefs about the deterrent
effect of the death penalty, nuclear power generation, climate change, brand loyalty and sexual
morality (see Fryer et al. forthcoming, Online Appendix C, Table 1, for a summary).
Confirmation bias is often founded on a first impression (Beattie and Baron 1988) and also
explains how two people can reach opposite opinions after they review common evidence
(Darley and Gross 1983). The defining feature of this bias is that additional information leads to
the polarization, rather than the moderation, of prior opinions.
Confirmation bias cannot be incorporated into traditional models because it violates a
basic assumption of conventional Bayesian learning (Eckstein et al. 1988; Erdem and Keane
1996; Roberts and Urban 1988). Where a rational Bayesian learner would ignore ambiguous new

6
information, confirmation bias causes the learner to interpret ambiguous new information as a
reinforcement of prior beliefs. Thus in contrast to learning models that allow people to give
higher weight to new signals from specific sources (Camacho et al. 2011), learning under
confirmation bias not only leads to different weighting of signals, but actually can reverse the
interpretation of the signal. Irrespective of the actual signal valence, a person with confirmation
bias will treat an ambiguous signal as positive if their prior belief is positive, and will treat it as
negative if their prior belief is negative. Such a biased updating in turn leads to overconfidence
so that people may come to believe with near certainty in a false hypothesis despite receiving an
infinite amount of information (Rabin and Schrag 1999).
In this paper, we investigate whether a learning model that allows for confirmation bias
performs better than a rational model that does not. Specifically, we focus on how individuals
judge their financial adviser over time based on the advice given to them. We believe that
confirmation bias is likely to be more relevant to services such as financial advice, where
consumers are not always able to objectively judge quality.

3.

THE MARKET FOR FINANCIAL ADVICE
The market for financial advice is growing as households face new and difficult choices.

“Do-it-yourself” finance is the term Ryan et al. (2011) coined to describe the increased
responsibility untrained or inexperienced people have been given for financial decisions. There is
ample evidence that people frequently make poor financial decisions when deciding on these
new and more complicated products (Campbell et al. 2011). Reasons for these errors include low
levels of financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011), issues of trust in markets and financial
products (Christelis et al. 2010), behavioral biases (Thaler and Benartzi 2004) and limited
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cognition (Lusardi and Mitchell 2006). Opportunities to learn from experience in financial
contexts are limited because many consequential decisions, such as the choice of a mortgage or
retirement account investment, are made infrequently, and feedback from outcomes is often
delayed. Financial firms may have incentives to make products more complex to impede
consumer learning and preserve profits (Carlin 2009; Carlin and Manso 2010). Financial choices,
and the mistakes that often follow, have serious implications for financial welfare and stability,
individually and in aggregate (Agarwal et al. 2009; Bar-Gill and Warren 2008; Campbell 2006;
Campbell et al. 2011).
Consumers can delegate difficult decisions to financial advisers to compensate for low
financial literacy and lack of expertise (Hackethal et al. 2012). However, theory predicts that an
adviser’s willingness to de-bias and educate clients can be diluted by incentive structures (e.g.
Inderst and Ottaviani 2009). Empirical studies likewise show that advisers can exploit the biases
of clients (Hackethal et al. 2012; Mullainathan et al. 2012) and that clients credulously continue
to trust advisers who deliver poor quality advice (Australian Securities and Investment
Commission 2012) (ASIC 2012). In a recent study, Agnew et al. (2018) illustrate how much first
impressions in the client-adviser relationship matter, complementing research that shows that
clients form opinions of their financial advisers rapidly (Yaniv and Kleinberger 2000). Together,
these findings explain how some advisers can successfully use strategies to build and maintain
client trust while also providing unhelpful advice (Anagol et al. 2017; Mullainathan et al. 2012).
Experimental work also shows that advisers who confirm a client’s views on straightforward
questions early in an advice relationship are subsequently rated as more trustworthy and
competent than advisers who contradict a client’s views. Furthermore, clients are more likely to
accept their later advice on complicated topics (Agnew et al. 2018). Thus, establishing trust early
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on can lead to fruitful business interactions subsequently. More trusted advisers are likely to be
able to charge higher fees and thus take a larger share of the benefits of the advice relationship
(Gennaioli et al. 2015).
Despite these hazards, citizens of many countries use advice services. For example,
Chater et al. (2010) report that 58% of individual investors’ stock purchases were influenced by
an adviser, in a survey of 6,000 consumers across eight EU countries. Holden et al. (2013) find
that people choose to work with advisers because the advisers have expertise in an area that their
clients do not. Other studies emphasize that the personal qualities of advisers matter; for
example, clients must decide if an adviser is trustworthy and competent before acting on advice.
Georgarakos and Inderst (2014) show that clients with limited financial capability are more
likely to follow advice if they trust their advisers, but trust depends on many factors, including
the client’s capability, the accuracy and quality of information provided, and a belief that the
adviser and client’s incentives are aligned (Sniezek and Van Swol 2001; Yaniv and Kleinberger
2000).
In summary, people are facing challenging new financial choices and may not have the
financial knowledge or experience to make sound decisions. Those who turn to advisers for help
cannot be certain of getting the best advice, yet they still must form beliefs about advisers’
quality using the signals they receive from them. Prior beliefs about advisers’ quality will depend
on client and adviser characteristics; these beliefs could also influence a client’s interpretation of
subsequent signals from the advisers. Clients who process information in a limited or biased way
are less likely to reach sound judgements about the quality of an adviser.
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4.

A MODEL OF CONFIRMATION BIAS

Learning under confirmation bias
While confirmation bias and the polarization of opinion that follows is at odds with
standard Bayesian updating models, it can be explained by updating models with the form of
limited memory introduced in Fryer et al. (forthcoming). Consider a rational Bayesian decision
maker who may or may not be able to discern the state of the world, in our case the quality of a
financial adviser. Assume that the decision maker, here the “client” forms an expectation over
the two states of the world: 𝐴𝐴 (the adviser is good), and 𝐵𝐵 (the adviser is bad). The client holds

an initial prior (or starting) belief that P(A)=λ0, which they update as they receive a sequence of
clear or ambiguous signals from an adviser. 1 We can interpret this starting belief as the client’s
initial belief about the adviser. The client receives a clear good (𝑎𝑎) or bad (𝑏𝑏) signal of the
adviser’s quality in the form of a correct or incorrect recommendation from the financial adviser.
The signal (recommendation) may either agree with, or contradict, what the client thinks is
factual or sound. The client uses clear signals to update their prior belief and form a posterior
expectation of the state of the world, i.e., of the quality of the adviser. Let s>1/2 denote the
probability the client receives a clear, good signal conditional on the adviser being good,
P(𝑎𝑎│𝐴𝐴)=𝑠𝑠, and assume that the probability of receiving a clear, good signal from a bad adviser is
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎│𝐵𝐵)=1−𝑠𝑠. The parameter s determines how much the beliefs of the client are influenced by
the signal, and therefore s can be interpreted as signal strength.

However, the client may also receive an ambiguous signal ab. In our context, an
ambiguous signal might be a recommendation on a topic where the client is inexperienced or

1

We note that Fryer et al (forthcoming) in their general model additionally allow for signals Ø that contain no
information. Since the financial advice we evaluate here in this study is inherently good or bad we do not allow for
empty signals.

10
uninformed. Ambiguous signals create an opportunity for confirmation bias to operate. Rational
Bayesian updaters ignore ambiguous signals and forms a posterior only over the sequence of
clear signals. They thus gradually uncover the true state of the world. However, when updaters
have a confirmation bias, they will not overlook an ambiguous signal. Rather they will interpret
the ambiguous signal in line with their current belief, either as 𝑎𝑎 or 𝑏𝑏, and thus reinforce their

existing view of the state of the world. Fryer et al. (forthcoming) show that limited memory – the
need to form a posterior belief on receipt of each signal rather than wait to the end of the
sequence - forces an interpretation of ambiguous signals that generate confirmation bias and
polarization of opinions.
More formally, in the rational model, beliefs are updated according to

sλt

 sλ + (1 − s )(1 − λ ) , if σ t +1 = a,
t
 t

(1 − s )λt
=
=
( A | λt , σ t +1 ) 
, if σ t +1 b,
(1) λt +1 P=
 (1 − s )λt + s (1 − λt )
λt ,
if σ t +1 = ab,


where σ t is the advice received in choice situation t (t=1,…, T), that is, the signal. When a
limited memory updater (Fryer et al., forthcoming, hereafter FHJ) holds a prior belief that the
adviser is good quality, he or she interprets an ambiguous signal as a good signal, and as a bad
signal when he or she holds a prior that the adviser is poor quality. In the limited memory (FHJ)
updating model, the client’s beliefs are updated according to:

sλt
1

if σ t +1 a=
, or σ t +1 ab and λt > ,
 sλ + (1 − s )(1 − λ ) , =
2
t
 t

(1 − s )λt
1
,=
if σ t +1 b=
, or σ t +1 ab and λt < ,
=
λt , σ t +1 ) 
(2) λt +1 P( A | =
2
 (1 − s )λt + s (1 − λt )

1
if λt = .
λt ,
2
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In our experimental application, discussed in detail in Section 5, clients view
professionally filmed videos of two advisers giving advice on four different advice topics. (Table
1 shows the scripts of the advice.) The sequence of the topics and the quality of the advice given
by each adviser varies by experimental treatment. The videos are adapted from the Agnew et al.
(2018) experiment and the signals are the advice given. 2 Clients perceive each piece of advice
given by each adviser as ambiguous or clear, and as good or bad. For each topic, the adviser
either provides an unequivocally right or wrong piece of advice based on financial theory but the
quality of that advice may not be apparent to all clients, depending on their financial knowledge
and experience. For example, for those with strong financial literacy, the advice given by each
adviser should provide clear signals of the adviser’s quality. However, for clients with limited
financial literacy or experience with the topic, some of the advice signals may be ambiguous.
The experimental design in this paper includes four advice topics from Agnew et al. (2018) and
six previously untested sequences of good/bad advice. The order in which we present topics to
experimental participants (clients), combined with the order in which each adviser gives either
good or bad advice creates a test of 24 sequences of signals of adviser quality for each of two
advisers, or a total of 48 sequences. The new variations in the advice sequences allow us to
observe, for the first time, whether participants update their beliefs about an adviser in a
conventionally rational way or with limited memory.
INSERT Table 1 ABOUT HERE
Figure 1 illustrates all possible paths of beliefs for the experimental “clients” under
different assumptions about initial priors and updating strategies (in rows). Given a client’s
initial prior beliefs and updating strategy, each path depends on how many advice topics were

2

To view an example of the video advice from a treatment in Agnew (2018), please follow this link
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-1NMLVfExG1ZzFhZWlrRWlsR2s/preview .
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perceived by the client as clear, and in which choice sets advice on the clear topics was given (in
columns, ranging from all topics perceived as clear to all topics perceived as ambiguous). The
size of the dots reflects the theoretical proportion of all possible choice patterns that pass through
the respective point. We arbitrarily set the probability that a good adviser offers a good signal, s,
to 0.75. Rows 1, 3 and 4 reflect FHJ updating with starting priors λ0 of 0.6, 0.5, and 0.4,
respectively. Row 2 is based on rational updating with starting prior λ0 equal to 0.5.
INSERT Figure 1 ABOUT HERE
For example, consider, the first column of graphs, where we assume that all topics are
clear to the client. Differences between paths thus only come from differences in the sequence of
good and bad advice that one adviser gives the client over four topics. If all topics are clear, and
if all clients have the same starting prior, rational and FHJ updating methods lead to the same
posterior beliefs (see column 1, rows 2 and 3). When moving to the next column of graphs, we
can see that if one topic is ambiguous, FHJ updating leads to deviations from the rationally
updated priors and polarization. The polarization becomes more pronounced as clients perceive
more topics to be ambiguous (columns further right), and becomes extreme when they perceive
all four topics to be ambiguous: FHJ updating clients reach an almost certain belief that the
adviser is good if they start with an initial prior larger than 0.5 (column 5, row 1) and reach an
almost certain belief that the adviser is bad if they start with a prior smaller than 0.5 (column 5,
row 4). Rational clients do not update their priors if all signals are ambiguous (column 5, row 2).
FHJ updaters also do not update when all signals are ambiguous and their starting prior is equal
to 0.5 (row 3, column 5).
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Model Description
In this section, we describe how confirmation bias can be calibrated and linked to contextual
variables using information on a client’s sequence of choices of as well as his or her willingness
to pay.
Assume a client k, =1,…, K, receives a sequence of tk=1,…, Tk signals 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = (𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 , 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 )

from two different sources (advisers) labeled R and L. We assume that the signals 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 and 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
received in choice set tk are either both clear or both ambiguous to the client, k. In our case, the

sequence represents the choice sets, the signals are advice on a financial topic, and the sources of
the signals are financial advisers. We further assume that (𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 , 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ) ∈ {(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏), (𝑏𝑏, 𝑎𝑎), (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)},

where from the perspective of the client, a is a clear signal of good quality, b is a clear signal of
bad quality, and ab is an ambiguous signal. In each choice set: i) one adviser gives good advice

and the other provides bad advice; ii) the client interprets the advice as either ambiguous or clear;
iii) the client chooses between the two sources based on their interpretation of the quality of the
signal. Thus, in our experiment, the client (k) chooses whether to follow the advice
(𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 , 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ) of adviser R or L provided in choice set t. We code the choice data as
(3)

1, if R was chosen at choice tk by client k ,
ykt = 
0, if L was chosen at choice tk by client k .

Further, assume that after having received T signals from each adviser, the client can
choose to purchase an additional unit from each adviser at a certain price pk . In our example, we
ask participants whether they would be willing to pay a particular amount for a one-hour session
with the adviser. Let ykL ( ykR ) be indicator variables, taking the value 1 if L (R) is chosen by
decision maker k in this context 3.

3

Note that the model can be extended to include more entities or more attributes to influence the different choices.
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Equations (1) and (2) describe how clients update their beliefs depending on whether they
are Bayesian rational decision makers, or whether they are prone to confirmation bias,
respectively. Which updating scheme a particular client uses is not known by the researcher and
needs to be inferred from the observed choices. Similarly, in many cases, the researcher does not
know whether a signal is clear or ambiguous to the decision maker and must make inferences
about this from the choice data.
In both updating schemes, the posterior belief (or updated prior) depends on the initial
prior belief λkr0 (or starting prior) over adviser r ∈ {R, L} of the decision maker k. The starting
prior itself depends on the characteristics of the advisers r ∈ {R, L} and the decision maker, X 0
(see Table 2 for a description of the variables used in our empirical example) and an unknown
vector of parameters β 0 . So that we can estimate this parameter, we make the starting prior
probability of adviser quality to be a logit function of features of the adviser and the client:
(4)

λkr0 =

exp( β 0 X 0 )
1 + exp( β 0 X 0 )

When combined with a value for signal strength, s, we can calculate λkjr , the updated prior
about adviser r ∈ {R, L} of decision maker k after choice set j, conditional on the client’s
updating scheme and signal clarity based on Equations (1) and (2). 4
INSERT Table 2 ABOUT HERE
We also infer from choice data and survey responses which type of updating scheme the
client uses and which topics are ambiguous or clear to him or her. If the client perceives the
signal to be clear (i.e., the topic is easy for them), we assume that he or she will choose the

4

To enable us to identify parameters, we set s to an arbitrary value greater than 0.5 and check sensitivity of
estimation to alternative choices. The results we report below use s=0.75.
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source that gives a high-quality signal in this choice set (i.e., the adviser who gives correct
advice). That is, if the topic is clear, the client chooses the advice based on its quality alone.
However, if the client perceives the signal to be ambiguous (i.e., the topic is hard and the client
cannot distinguish good from bad advice), we assume that the client will make the choice in this
choice set according to his or her posterior belief about the source, in our case, based on
posterior beliefs about the advisers’ qualities.
We denote qrkt ∈ (a, b) as the quality associated with signal σ rt that decision maker k
t
receives. We further define qkt equal to 1 if qRk
= a and -1 otherwise. We acknowledge that

decision makers still make some errors when choosing and that this error is extreme value
distributed with scale 1/ β1 and 1/ β 2 , respectively, and thus obtain

exp( β1qkt )
=
P( ykt 1|=
σ tk =clear)
1 + exp( β1qkt )

(5)
and

exp( β 2 ·(λktR − λktL ))
.
P( ykt 1|=
σ tk =ambiguous)
(6)=
1 + exp( β 2 ·(λktR − λktL ))
Thus both β1 and β 2 are scale parameters: as β1 ( β 2 ) approaches infinity, the
expression in the right hand side approaches 1 for qkj =1 ( λktR > λktL ), and 0 otherwise.
Next we turn to the client’s willingness to pay. The client can choose to pay for an
additional unit from each adviser (i.e. advice from both, one, or none of the advisers). We model
this choice as follows:
(7)

exp( β30 + β31λkTr + X 3 β32 )
P(willing to pay for r ) =
,
1 + exp( β30 + β31λkTr + X 3 β32 )
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where X 3 are attributes of the client and r, including the price of another unit of the R or L, β30 is
a constant, β31 captures the impact of the posterior on the willingness to pay, and β32 is a vector of
unknown parameters.
Summarizing, in our specification, clients’ sequences of choices, including their
decisions to pay for another round of advice, are functions of posterior beliefs about r. These
posterior beliefs are, in turn, a function of the way clients update their beliefs (either rationally or
with confirmation bias) and of which signals clients perceive to be clear (i.e., which topics are
easy to them). Our model assigns clients to latent classes distinguished by clarity or ambiguity of
the signals in choice set tk and to latent classes distinguished by their updating scheme. In the
interest of parsimony, we assume that the probability that a client is a particular updating type
and the probability that a client treats any topic as clear are independent, conditioning on the
characteristics of the individual client, so that: 5
(8) =
Pk (τ ) P=
Pk (τ clarity ) Pk (τ rationality ),
k (τ clarity ,τ rationality )
and
(9)

P=
k (τ clarity )

Tk

=
P (σ
∏
tk =1

k

tk

clear).

Dependence between the latent classes for any client k is captured by allowing class
membership probabilities to be influenced by client-specific covariates X4 and X5 and associated
parameter vectors β 4 , β5 , and signal specific constants β 5tk , with β 5tk = β 5t ' k ' for σ tk = σ t ′k ′ :
(10)

5

Pk (τ rational ) =

exp( β 4 X 4 )
,
1 + exp( β 4 X 4 )

Note that in our empirical example without any further assumptions there exist two types of updaters as well as a
classification of clear or ambiguous for each of four topics, which results in 2^5=32 different combinations.
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and

=
Pk=
(σ kt clear)

(11)

exp( β5tk + β5 X 5 )
.
1 + exp( β5tk + β5 X 5 )

We estimate the parameters θ = {β 0 , β1 , β 2 , β 4 , β5 } by jointly maximizing the likelihood
of choices and willingness to pay decisions. Conditional on the client belonging to one of the C
clarity-rationality class combinations τ c , c=1,…,C, the likelihood of client k’s sequence of
choices is
T

=
=
(12)
l=
=
P( ykt 1| τ c ) y 1 P
(willing to pay for entity R | τ c ) y 1 =
P(willing to pay for entity L | τ c ) y 1.
∏
k (θ | τ c )
R
k

kt

L
k

tk =1

The unconditional likelihood of client k’s sequence of choices is thus:
C

(13)

lk (θ ) = ∑ Pk (τ c )lk (θ | τ c ).
c =1

Parameter identification
A formal analysis of identification is not feasible for the complex, non-linear learning
model discussed above (see also the discussion in Ching et al. 2013). In the following, we sketch
our identification strategy for the key model parameters.
First, consider the initial prior belief about r, which is the starting prior λkr0 . The starting
prior belief is the basis for the updated posterior belief and thus influences both the choices of r
as well as willingness to pay. The starting prior belief itself also influences directly the choices
made in choice set 1, as in this set we assume that (up to uncertainty) the adviser (source) with
the higher initial prior is chosen if the topic is ambiguous. Since the design of the experiment
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(discussed in Section 5 and described in Table 3) ensures that participants (clients) face both
easy as well as hard (ambiguous) signals in choice set 1 (refer to panel B in Table 3), we thus
obtain sufficient information to estimate the starting prior as well as how it depends on advisers’
r and decision maker’s characteristics ( β1 ).
INSERT Table 3 ABOUT HERE
Next we discuss the signal strength s=Pr (𝑎𝑎│𝐴𝐴) = Pr(b│B) , which in our empirical

application is the probability that a good (bad) signal comes from a good (bad) adviser. We set
s=0.75 to allow the probability to be greater than 0.5 but less than one that a good adviser
delivers good advice, to ensure that updating can occur. We test for the sensitivity of results at
s=0.60 and results remain largely unchanged.
The parameter β 2 is in turn identified via the starting prior λkr0 and s. These two
parameters jointly define the updated beliefs and can thus be considered as pre-determined
covariates when participants face an ambiguous topic. Choices made in choice sets with
ambiguous signals can thus identify β 2 .
Choices made over the different choice sets allow us to identify the latent “clarity
classes.” More specifically, our assumption about the choice process can (up to uncertainty in the
choice process) be summarized as follows. If we observe that the client chooses the adviser that
gives a bad quality signal, we can conclude that the signal was ambiguous for him or her. We
cannot make a similar inference if the client chooses the adviser that gives a good quality signal,
as this could imply either that the signal was clear for that client or that they chose the adviser
because of a higher associated posterior belief. The combined information of updated prior
beliefs about the advisers and incorrect choices of advice thus allows us to identify what we call
clarity classes.
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Since the starting prior belief about the adviser can be inferred from the data without any
assumptions about how clients update their beliefs and since signal strength s is fixed, we can
calculate the posteriors for both updating schemes. The posterior associated with the higher
likelihood then helps to pin down rationality classes.

Discontinuity of the likelihood function and estimation method
Estimation of our model is complicated by the fact that the likelihood function is
discontinuous for those cases where participants update their beliefs according to the FHJ
updating scheme. The discontinuity in the likelihood appears along the dimensions of the
parameters of prior beliefs. Even in the simplest case when the starting prior belief is represented
by a single constant (as illustrated in Figure 2), as this constant moves from zero to one and
crosses particular thresholds dependent on other parameters, the values and the counts of the
possible updated prior beliefs change discontinuously.
INSERT Figure 2 ABOUT HERE
Figure 2 compares the updated prior beliefs λ4 (after a sequence of four choices has been made)
under the rational and FHJ updating for three values of the signal strength parameter s as the
starting prior λ0 changes from zero to one. For each value of the starting prior λ0 we draw all
values of posterior beliefs that are possible in the model (by assuming all possible clarity and
quality combinations of signals), with the size of the circles indicating the number of theoretical
paths leading to that belief. For example, in row 1 and column 2, at a signal strength of s=0.75
and where all participants use FHJ updating, we see that a small change in the prior belief from
0.49 to 0.51 results in large differences in the posterior: for a prior of 0.49 most posteriors are
smaller than 0.1, while at a prior of 0.51 most posteriors are larger than 0.8. Since both the prior
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as well as the posterior beliefs influence the likelihood function, a small change in the prior can
thus lead to a huge - and discontinuous - change in the likelihood function. We use Sequential
Adaptive Bayesian Learning (SABL) proposed by Durham and Geweke (2014) to overcome this
challenge and estimate the model. Appendix A provides a further discussion of the discontinuity
problem and outlines the estimation procedure.
5.

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We designed our experiment to achieve two goals. First, we aimed to collect data to

estimate and compare a model of client confirmation bias (FHJ) with a model of rational
(standard Bayesian) choice. Second, we aimed to measure the participants’ willingness to pay for
advice and how it is affected by confirmation bias. Since clients who lack experience or financial
literacy are probably more susceptible to manipulation, we also collect an array of demographics,
preferences, financial capability measures, and psychological inventories to help identify these
clients.
We fielded a four-part online survey that included an incentivized choice experiment in
December 2014. 6 Members of a nationally representative online panel were invited to complete
the survey. Those who responded to the invitation had to pass two screening questions to meet
age and gender quotas. This resulted in 2,003 “clients”. To ensure incentive compatibility, we
compensated participants who completed the experiment for their time and rewarded them if
they chose correct advice in each choice set and in a post experiment quiz. Participants first
answered a set of questions that measured their general financial literacy and numeracy (Lusardi
and Mitchell 2011; Lipkus et al. 2001), and that evaluated their understanding and experience of

6

The survey offered participants who completed all questions a small compensation for their time (around $4) and
one entry in a prize draw for $A50 for each correct choice of advice.
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the participants of the four advice topics covered by advisers in the subsequent discrete choice
experiment (DCE).
Our DCE offers “clients” a sequence of videos of advisers who give financial advice on
four common and important consumer finance topics. 7 The topics include credit card debt
repayment, retirement savings account consolidation, diversification in equity investment, and
index fund fees. Table 1 records the scripts for the good and bad advice for each topic.
To identify the effect of confirmation bias in the DCE, we ensured advice topics,
advisers, the environment and the mode of advice delivery to be uniform. Figure 3 shows the
advisers from the videos and their “names”. The videos allow us to control the two advisers
shown to each participant, the order of advice topics, the quality of advice given by each adviser
for each topic and the attributes of advisers giving advice.
INSERT Figure 3 ABOUT HERE
In the DCE videos, two advisers give a recommendation on each of the four topics: each
participant received four pairs of advice; the two advisers were the same across the four advice
topics for each participant; and in each case, one adviser provided a correct recommendation,
while the other provided an incorrect recommendation. Correct and incorrect advice hereafter is
termed “good” and “bad” in line with the description of the method in the previous section. The
videos systematically varied adviser factors - the adviser’s gender (2 options: male or female)
and age (2 options: young or old), professional certification (2 options: certification presented or
not) - the order of the advice topics (4 options: first, second, third, or fourth) and the quality of
the advice (2 options: correct or incorrect).

7

The topics were previously used by Agnew et al. (2018) based on their relevance for people around the world, that
they had unequivocally right and wrong answers and were based on the mistakes often made in these areas.
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The experiment used a between-subjects design. As noted, the advice viewed by any one
participant is provided by the same two advisers; hence, variation in adviser factors (age, gender,
certification) is a between-subjects manipulation. To minimize the between-subjects treatment
groups, we used a fold-over design in which we created the 2^3 complete factorial of possible
advisers and paired each of them with their “mirror image” (that is, the exact opposite level, so
that a younger woman adviser was matched with an older male adviser). This produced pairs of
advisers who were orthogonal in the differences in factor levels. The resulting design is
optimally efficient under the assumption that a conditional multinomial logit choice model
underlies the participant choices (Street et al. 2005; Street and Burgess 2007). This design
approach produced four between-subject treatment groups and is shown in panel A of Table 3.
Further variation in the DCE relates to between-subject manipulation of a) topic sequence
and b) order in which good and bad advice is given by each adviser. Variation in these orders is
essential to test hypotheses about formation of persistent participant preferences for advisers.
The fold-over design used to create the between-subjects manipulations ensures variation in
quality of advice. We also maximized variation in adviser attributes by ensuring that both
financial advisers gave advice on the same topic in each pair. Thus, we combined the betweensubjects treatment groups (4) with a design to vary the orders of topics (4 levels) and good and
bad advice (2 levels). A full factorial design would have required a very complex survey
program and a very large sample, since it implies 16 possible sequences of good (G) and bad (B)
advice and 24 possible sequences of topics. To maximize variation and to enable a test of
confirmation bias we used six sequences of good and bad advice orders – those where each
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adviser gives two good and two bad recommendations (see panel C of Table 3) - and topic
sequences with an equal number of hard and easy financial topics (see panel B of Table 3). 8
When we combined the four possible pairs of advisers with the six possible sequences of
topics and the six possible sequences of advice quality, we obtained a design with 6*6*4 =144
conditions. We randomly assigned at least 10 and up to 14 participants to each condition.
After the DCE task, participants rated the trustworthiness, competence, attractiveness,
understanding, professionalism, financial expertise, genuineness and persuasiveness of the
advisers they saw, and stated their willingness to pay $X for a one-hour session with both, one or
none of the advisers. We assigned to participants fixed fee values

X ∈ {50,100,150, 250,500, 750} so as to minimize their predictability from the other
manipulated characteristics of the experiment condition. After they had answered questions
about demographics (e.g., marital status, household size and number of dependents, education,
labor market status, income, gross assets, and debts/liabilities) and personal characteristics,
including personality traits and risk attitudes, participants read debriefing information that
explained correct advice. The survey closed with an incentivized quiz on the debriefing
material. 9
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In aggregate, participants chose correct recommendations 79% of the time. The
percentages of correct choices by topic are 86% for retirement account consolidation, 88% for

8

We rely on the results by Agnew et al (2018) who find that two topics (debt repayment and retirement account
consolidation) are relatively easy (E) and that the other two topics (diversification and index fund fees) are relatively
hard (H).
9 Appendix A compares the characteristics of the sample with the Australian Census data from 2011. Our sample
reports slightly higher educational attainments and a higher probability of being married than the census shows, but
otherwise is representative of the population.
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credit card debt repayment, 79% for stock diversification and 64% for index fund fees.
Participants chose the advice of the young female adviser two percentage points more often than
the advice of the older male who appears alongside her in the experiment. Participants chose the
younger male and older female equally often. On average, participants were also more likely to
choose the certified adviser (52%) than the uncertified adviser (48%), illustrating the importance
of an initial good impression. The fact that this difference was smaller for the “easy topics”
(retirement account consolidation and credit card debt repayment; 2.6%), than for the “hard
topics” (stock diversification and index fund fees; 5%), indicates that beliefs about the adviser
are more important if the signal quality is ambiguous.
We estimated our model using data from 1,903 of the 2,003 participants and held back
the remaining responses to assess hold-out fit. In-sample fit was satisfactory and hold-out fit did
not deviate very much from in-sample fit, which shows that our model does not over-fit the data:
The model predicted an average (over all choice sets) probability of 0.69 for the estimation
sample that the adviser who was in fact chosen would be chosen, and it predicted a related
probability of 0.69 for the hold out sample. When the adviser was not chosen, the predicted
choice probability decreased to 0.29 for the estimation sample, whereas it decreased to 0.28 for
the hold-out sample. The predicted probabilities were less discriminating in the willingness to
pay choice probabilities. When a participant chose to pay the adviser, the model’s average
predicted probability was 0.48 for the estimation sample data and 0.44 for the hold-out data.
When a participant chose not to pay the adviser, the average predicted probability of being paid
was 0.28 for the estimation sample data and 0.34 for the hold-out sample data. Thus, the model
slightly underestimates the probability that a participant is willing to pay the proposed fee for the
adviser.
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We also compared our model to a model that assumes pure rational updating (where

Pk (τ rational ) =1 for all k), in line with traditional learning models. The logmarginal density for this
restricted model is -5887.17 compared to a logmarginal density of -5827.47 for our proposed
model for in-sample fit, and -305.62 versus -298.35 for hold-out sample fit, thus demonstrating
that accounting for confirmation bias significantly improves model fit. Indeed, as also discussed
further below, 63% of participants update their beliefs in a way that is not consistent with
rational Bayesian updating, which leads to both polarized choice probabilities as well as
willingness to pay estimate.
Table 4 reports the model estimates. For each parameter, we report the mode of its
posterior distribution as well as the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of this distribution, that is, the
corresponding equi-tailed credible interval (CI). There is a 95% probability that the parameter is
not zero if zero does not fall in the CI. Next, we discuss each of the model components.
INSERT Table 4 ABOUT HERE

Prior belief about adviser
We allow the starting prior belief about an adviser’s quality to depend on the trust that a
participant has in financial advisers (Guiso et al. 2008) and also whether the adviser displayed a
professional certification in the experiment (Agnew et al. 2018). Both factors have been shown
by earlier studies to influence whether people will take financial advice. The mode of the
distribution for the trust parameter equals 0.520, and the 95% credible interval does not contain
zero. This shows that participants who rate financial advisers as trustworthy hold a higher prior
belief that the adviser is good, as we would expect. The mode of the distribution for the noncertification parameter equals -0.085 and the 95% CI again does not contain zero. Based on the
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posterior draws of the parameters (not reported here), we can infer the distribution of the
difference in prior beliefs for certified versus uncertified advisers. From the perspective of
participants who trust financial advisers already (“Trust in advisers” variable =1), this posterior
distribution has a mean of 0.016 with an associated 95% CI of [0.001, 0.036]. For participants
who generally distrust financial advisers (“Trust in advisers” variable =-1), the impact of
certification is double: this posterior distribution has a mean of 0.032 with a 95% CI of [0.003,
0.073]. The mean of the posterior for participants who are neutral about financial advisers
(“Trust in advisers” variable =0) is 0.023 [0.002, 0.054]. We infer that if an adviser displays a
professional certification, participants form a significantly higher prior belief that he or she will
give good advice and this higher expectation will be subsequently reflected in higher choice
probabilities in the case of ambiguous topics and higher willingness to pay for additional advice
from this adviser. Certification has a stronger influence on participants who are generally
skeptical of adviser quality. This is in line with the findings by Agnew et al. (2018) who show
that displaying a certification significantly increases an adviser’s likelihood of having this or her
advice accepted by a client.

Choice of advice
Participants’ ability to choose good advice depends on the clarity of the topic. In the case of easy
topics, the participant will choose the good advice (up to some error, equation (5)). In the case of
hard topics, equation (6) posits that (up to some error) participants will choose the adviser they
rate as better, according to participants’ updated (posterior) beliefs. The parameters associated
with both the quality of the advice and the belief about the adviser are positive, equaling 4.138
and 2.663, respectively, and the 95% credible intervals based on their posterior distributions do
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not include zero. This translates into the following choice probabilities: the probability that the
participant chooses good advice if the topic is easy equals exp(4.296) / (1 + exp(4.296)) = 0.99 ;
if the topic is ambiguous, the probability of an adviser R with associated belief λ R = 1 being
chosen when being evaluated against an adviser L with associated belief λ L = 0 is
exp(2.510·(1 − 0)) / (1 + exp(2.510·(1 − 0))) =
0.92 . These results confirm that ambiguous signals

are related to more uncertainty and variability in participants’ choices.

Willingness to pay for advice
Our model assumes that the willingness to pay a particular price for an additional hour
with the adviser depends on the actual price charged, several characteristics of the participant, as
well as the participant’s posterior belief about this adviser.
Table 4 shows that parameters here have the expected signs but some have credible
intervals that include zero. The impact of price is negative with a mode of -0.085 and a 95% CI
interval that does not include zero. On the other hand, the impact of the posterior belief about the
adviser is positive (18.309) with the associated 95% CI also not including zero. Of the remaining
participant characteristics, the only parameter with a CI that does not include zero is the indicator
for whether the participant has paid for financial advice in the past. The mode of this parameter
is positive at 0.466 with a 95% CI of [0.348, 0.570] and we conclude that participants who have
paid for advice in the past are more willing to pay than those who have not.
Based on these parameters and Equation (7) it is possible to calculate the associated
price difference ∆price= price new − priceold that a participant is willing to pay for a specific
difference in posterior beliefs ∆belief= belief new − belief old , namely
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(9)

β posterior
∆price =
− 2 price ·∆belief·100,
β2

where the multiplication with 100 is necessary because the price was divided by 100 before
entering the estimation. We can use this formula to calculate the additional dollar amount that
participants are willing to pay for their preferred adviser. Based on the posterior distribution of
the estimates, we obtain additional willingness to pay estimates that have a mean of $1722 with
the lower bound of the 95% CI equal to $189 and the upper bound equal to $4639.

Rational versus FHJ updating
Our model shows that a 62.9% of participants exhibit confirmation bias. In our setup, we
use participants’ conscientiousness and impulsiveness to explain which participants are more
likely to display confirmation bias. Table 4 shows that participants with high impulsiveness are
less likely to be rational updaters (mode of -0.3445, the 95% CI does not include zero). This
parameter implies that more impulsive participants are more likely to interpret ambiguous signals
as a confirmation of their prior belief. In contrast, high conscientiousness has a positive mode
(0.243) but the 95% CI does include zero.

Clarity of topics
In our model, we assume that whether a topic is perceived as clear or ambiguous by a
participant depends on the participant’s characteristics as well as on the topic itself. More
specifically, we find that participants with more expertise are more discerning. Results show that
participants with high knowledge of the financial products related to the advice, high financial
literacy and high numeracy are more likely to perceive a topic as clear. For all these variables,
the modes of the posterior distributions are positive and the 95% CIs do not contain zero. Gender
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and participants’ age also affect whether a topic is perceived as clear versus ambiguous: female
participants are significantly more likely to perceive a topic as clear and so are participants who
are 40 years or older. In addition, the size and sign of the topic-specific constants is in line with
the share of correct answers for these topics. The advice related to index fund fees is perceived as
significantly more difficult than all other topics since the associated 95% CI does not overlap
with the CI of any other topic.
Table 5 reports the percentage of participants who belong to each of the 16 possible
clarity classes. For example, 18.2% of participants perceive all topics to be clear; 3.8% of
participants perceive all topics to be ambiguous; and 21.9% of participants struggle to understand
advice on index fund fees even though all other topics are clear to them.
INSERT Table 5 ABOUT HERE
Illustration of Model Implications
Our model allows us to compare the impact of the participants’ two different updating
strategies on their choices. It additionally allows us to measure the impact of first impressions on
subsequent choices. To illustrate, consider two participants A and B who update their beliefs
according to the rational and biased updating scheme, respectively. Let the right adviser (R)
display a certification and the left adviser (L) not display a certification. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that the participants distrust financial advisers, we set other characteristics
at the medians of the survey sample distributions, and we fix estimated parameters at the mode
of the posterior distributions. Both participants will thus have the same prior belief about the
R
R
λ=
right (R) and the left (L) adviser of λ=
A0
B0

L
L
λ=
λ=
A0
B0

exp(1.728 + 0.085 − 520)
= 0.785 and
1 + exp(1.728 + 0.085 − 520)

exp(1.728 − 0.085 − 0.520)
= 0.755 . Assume that Adviser R gives good advice on
1 + exp(1.728 − 0.085 − 0.520)
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a clear topic in the first choice set and that both advisers give (from the client’s perspective)
ambiguous advice in the remaining three choice sets.
Table 6 shows how the updated prior beliefs, choice probabilities for the advisers in each
choice set evolve in this scenario. Both clients update their beliefs in the same way at the first
choice because they get clear information about adviser quality. Participant A’s beliefs about the
advisers, as well as the associated choice probabilities, remain the same throughout the later
three choice sets as this participant simply ignores the ambiguous information and ends the
experiment still favoring Adviser R. In contrast, Participant B interprets all new information in
line with current beliefs, so this participant will treat all ambiguous information as evidence that
Adviser R is good and that Adviser L is bad. Thus, Participant B’s updated beliefs about Adviser
R rise steadily and so does his or her probability of choosing Adviser R.
INSERT Table 6 ABOUT HERE
The table thus shows that FHJ updating leads to a choice probability that is very close to
one for Adviser R and close to zero for Adviser L, while the same probabilities are 0.9 (Adviser
R) and 0.1 (Adviser L) for the rational updater. It also shows the difference a first impression
makes. An early clear signal has a stronger influence on the FHJ updater, whose opinion
approaches certainty over few choices. Combined with Equation (13), the results in Table allow
us to calculate the monetary value of a first impression. While both consumers are willing to pay
$176 more for Adviser R after the first piece of advice has been given, this amount rises by 18%
to $214 after all four pieces for the FHJ updater whereas it stays constant for the rational updater.

7.

CONCLUSION
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Using a unique discrete choice experiment, this paper contributes to both the financial
advice and behavioral finance literature by measuring the economic consequences of two
common biases on clients’ willingness to pay for financial advisers. To our knowledge, this is
the first time this has been done. Our model puts a dollar value on differences in first
impressions, as well as on differences in updating schemes, and demonstrates that ignoring
confirmation bias will underestimate the impact of first impressions. More specifically, we show
that, although immediately after the first impression the willingness to pay is the same for the
rational and the biased learner, three additional pieces of ambiguous information can lead the
biased learner to be willing to pay 18% more than their rational counterpart.
Furthermore, our results show that it is too strong to assume that all learners apply
rational Bayesian methods when they receive and process signals of attribute quality. However,
to our knowledge, we are the first to show, in a financial context, how many consumers are
actually failing to update in a rational way. Utilizing the learning model developed by Fryer et.
al. (forthcoming), we find that almost two thirds of participants in our experiment did not use the
commonly assumed rational method, instead they made choices consistent with the FHJ model, a
limited memory updating process where people use unclear signals to confirm and reinforce their
current beliefs. This significant percentage is consistent with Fryer et al.’s (forthcoming)
experimental test examining how opinions related to public policy issues are formed. Our
experiment also presents evidence that people who are unsure of how to interpret the signals they
receive and who do not ignore them, not only end up with strongly biased beliefs, but will spend
accordingly. We also demonstrate how polarizing opinions about financial advisers can result,
even when consumers are given identical signals but start with different priors.
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Our research provides a glimpse into the type of decision maker that is more prone to
become a biased updater. By using participant characteristics to predict the probability of using
rational versus FHJ updating, we show that particularly impulsive people are more likely to
suffer financially from the information processing bias. Also, our model segments decision
makers by their updating strategies. This information has many potential applications for
companies. For example, companies can gain valuable insight into how customer segment(s) are
likely to respond to new information, based on their prior beliefs, either towards more moderate
or more polarized preferences.
In the context of financial advice, our model provides useful insights for financial
advisers and public policy. For the former, we show that displaying recognizable professional
certifications has a significant positive impact on first impressions which then filters through to a
higher chance that clients will accept advice and a higher willingness to pay for additional
advice. Thus, advisers should assess the costs of gaining a qualification in the light of these
possible future gains. The implications for public policy are even more interesting: regulators
should consider how advisers are able to use credentials to increase their pay. If credentials are
signals of superior service and recommendations, then credentials can provide helpful
information to the consumer. However, many different certifications of varying quality may be
available to advisers. Future research could study more extensively whether clients can
distinguish among the many credentials available and whether the quality of the designation is
properly incorporated into clients’ willingness to pay for advisers. If not, regulators should
consider whether they should limit the designations available to those meeting certain criteria. In
addition, while current research emphasizes improvements to financial literacy to encourage
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sensible financial decisions, our model shows that less impulsivity can also increase client
welfare. Thus, our model proposes another potentially important lever.
Finally, our results could stimulate research into learning models that account for
behavioral tendencies, so as to capture how people with limited financial knowledge approach
decision making. One possible modification of our model involves the updating strategies. That
is, we assume that participants are either purely FHJ or purely rational updaters so they interpret
ambiguous signals as exactly confirming their prior belief (FHJ updating) or as not being
informative at all (rational updating). It is possible that participants interpret ambiguous signals
as only partly confirming their priors, meaning that there is a continuum between extreme
updating processes.
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Table 1: Financial Advice Script
This table reports the scripts for the four advice topics used in the choice experiment. Participants make four choices in total, one for each advice topic, with topic
orders following the experimental design shown in Table 3. Advice is delivered to participants in videos. Each choice set begins with a narrator’s introduction,
then two advisers provide identical advice (the underlined advice) at the beginning of their talk and then divergent advice at the end (the italicized part). After
participants have viewed both advisers’ videos, they choose which adviser they would follow, and proceed to the next topic.
Narrator Introduction
Advice
Narrator Introduction
Advice
Good Advice: I understand that you have
Good Advice: I understand you need help
Paying Down Debt
Choosing an Index
In this scenario, you have
some large credit card debt but recently
regarding your choice of share index fund.
Fund
inherited money. It is important to think
In this scenario, you are Did you know that all share index funds
accumulated some large
about your overall financial position when
thinking about investing invest with the aim of matching the overall
outstanding credit card debt with a
making a decision about what to do. It is
share market return? These various share
in a managed share
high associated interest rate.
easy to simply save this big sum of money in
index funds provide an almost identical
index fund. The next 2
Recently, you have inherited some
product so why pay a fund manager more
money unexpectedly and would like a savings account to achieve a savings goal, financial advisers will
than the others for the same thing.
but the interest gained is far smaller than the recommend what you
to know what to do with it. The
Therefore, I recommend that you choose the
high interest expense of not paying down
should do about it.
next 2 financial advisers will
share index fund with the lowest
your credit card debt. Therefore, I
recommend what you should do.
management fees.
recommend you pay off your credit card debt
to eliminate the high interest charges.
Bad Advice: [Insert underlined above] It is
Bad Advice [Insert underlined above] but
hard to save big sums of money so it is
some fund managers have better reputations
important to think about your special savings
than others and you get what you pay for.
goals when making this decision. Therefore,
Therefore, I recommend that you avoid the
I recommend you ignore your credit card
share index funds with low management
debt for now and put your inheritance in a
fees.
separate savings account.
Good Advice: I see that you have three
Good Advice: I understand you need help
Consolidating Retirement
Diversifying a Stock
superannuation accounts with different super Portfolio
regarding how to invest your superannuation
Accounts
In this scenario, suppose you have
funds. Did you know that people are
In this scenario, you are money. Did you know money invested in
just changed jobs and started a new typically charged regular fixed
thinking about investing shares can go up and down? It is good to try
administration fees on all of these
to balance out the shares that go up with the
superannuation account. Currently,
in the share market.
superannuation accounts? As a result, I
shares that go down. Therefore, I
you already have two other
The next 2 financial
recommend that you roll all of these
recommend that you spread your money
superannuation accounts from past
advisers will
accounts together so you are not paying
across a variety of shares in different types
jobs. The next 2 financial advisers
recommend what you
extra fees.
should do about it.
of companies and industries.
will recommend what you should
Bad Advice: [Insert underlined above]
Bad Advice: [Insert underlined above] That
do about it.
Despite that, I recommend that you not roll
is why it is good to invest in something you
all of these accounts together so you are
know and can easily monitor. Therefore, I
diversified across different superannuation
recommend that you invest your money in
funds.
one blue chip company.
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Table 2: Variable description
This table reports definitions of variables used in the estimation of choice model (eqn 13) where Xi are vectors of
explanatory variables for the components of the model (eqns , consisting of elements shown by “x” in the
corresponding column). Variables are computed from responses to an online survey of a representative sample of
2003 Australian adults conducted in December 2014.
Variable Name

X0

X3

X4

X5

Description

Constant
Adviser characteristics
Displays NO credential

x

x

x

x

Constant; topic specific for X5

x

Price

x

Posterior

x

Indicator variable that equals 1 if only adviser’s name was
displayed and -1 when “Certified Financial Planner” and
adviser’s name was displayed.
Price in $ (divided by 100) for one additional hour with this
adviser
Posterior belief about adviser after advice on all four topics
has been provided – estimated within the model

Advice
Good advice

Topic: Account consolidation

x

Topic: Stock diversification

x

Topic: Index fund fee

x

Topic: Debt repayment

x

Indicator variable that equals 1 if the wrong advice was given
in the particular choice set, -1 otherwise. Enters the model via
the choice specification in Equation (5)
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the topic was account
consolidation, 0 otherwise.
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the topic was stock
diversification, 0 otherwise.
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the topic was index fund
management fees, 0 otherwise.
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the topic was debt
repayment, 0 otherwise.

Participant characteristics
Participant female

x

Participant older than 39 years

x

Trust in advisers

x

Paid for advice

x

Household income
Confidence in financial decisions

x
x

Financial risk tolerance

x

Decision maker

x

Financial literacy

x

Numeracy

x

Product knowledge

x

An indicator variable that equals 2 if the participant is a
female, 1 otherwise.
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant is a older
than 39 years, 0 otherwise.
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant reported
general trust in financial advisers, -1 if distrust, 0 otherwise
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant has ever paid
for financial advice, -1 if they have not
Household income ($’000, mean centered)
Indicator variable that equals 1 if participant has high
confidence in their own ability to make financial decision, -1
if low
Indicator variable that equals 1 if participant’s risk tolerance
is high and -1 if low
Indicator variable that equals 1 when the participant is most
responsible for financial decisions, 0 when jointly responsible
and -1 when someone else is responsible.
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant’s correct
percentage on four financial literacy questions is above the
sample median, 0 otherwise. Questions test simple interest,
inflation, diversification, and compound interest.
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant’s correct
percentage on three numeracy questions is above the sample
median, 0 otherwise. Questions test fractions, percentages
and probabilities.
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant’s correct
percentage on four financial product questions is above the
sample median, 0 otherwise. Questions test topics used in
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Conscientiousness

x

Impulsiveness

x

Market experience

x

advice experiment: debt, index funds, account consolidation,
diversification.
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant’s
conscientiousness is above the sample median, 0 otherwise.
Participants rated themselves as organized, responsible,
hardworking and careless (reverse coded) on a four-point
scale. Ratings are averaged.
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant’s
impulsiveness is above the sample median, 0 otherwise.
Participants rated themselves as buying too much, buying
impulsively, buying without planning, and/or buying
unnecessarily on a five point scale. Ratings are averaged.
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant’s
percentage on owning four financial securities is above the
sample median, 0 otherwise. Participants reported whether
they owned a credit card (debt), units in an index fund (fees),
a superannuation account (consolidation) and stocks
(diversification).
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Table 3: Experimental design
This table shows the structure of the experiment. Each participant in the experiment makes four choices of financial
advice where the design of the four choice sets consists of: one row from Panel A (adviser characteristics); one row
from Panel B (sequence of advice topics); and one row from Panel C (sequence of delivery of good or bad advice
from Adviser 1 and Adviser 2). Panel A shows the combinations of adviser characteristics: each pair of advisers
consisted of an adviser with a triple (gender, age, certification) and an adviser with its reverse. Adviser 1 appeared
on the left-hand side of the choice set screen and Adviser 2 appeared on the right-hand side. Each participant saw the
same two advisers for the entire experiment and each adviser stayed on the same side of the screen throughout the
experiment. Panel B shows the sequence of advice topics for each condition in the experiment where “E” stands for
one of the easy topics (debt and account consolidation) and “H” stands for one of the hard topics (fees and
diversification). Panel C shows the eight sequences of advice quality for each condition in the experiment where
“G” stands for good advice, while “B” stands for bad advice.
Panel A. Design of adviser pairs
Adviser 1

Adviser 2

Pair

Gender

Age

Certification

Gender

Age

Certification

1
2
3
4

Female
Female
Male
Male

Young
Old
Young
Old

Yes
No
No
Yes

Male
Male
Female
Female

Old
Young
Old
Young

No
Yes
Yes
No

Panel B. Sequence of advice topics
Sequence
Choice 1
1
Diversification
2
Consolidation
3
Diversification
4
Consolidation
5
Diversification
6
Consolidation

Choice 2
Fees
Debt
Consolidation
Diversification
Consolidation
Diversification

Panel C. Design of the sequence of advice quality
Advice from adviser 1
Quality
1st topic
2nd topic 3rd topic
Sequence
1
G
G
B
2
G
B
G
3
G
B
B
4
B
G
G
5
B
G
B
6
B
B
G

Choice 3
Consolidation
Diversification
Fees
Debt
Debt
Fees

Choice 4
Debt
Fees
Debt
Fees
Fees
Debt

Clarity
HHEE
EEHH
HEHE
EHEH
HEEH
EHHE

Advice from adviser 2
4th topic

1st topic

2nd topic

3rd topic

4th topic

B
B
G
B
G
G

B
B
B
G
G
G

B
G
G
B
B
G

G
B
G
B
G
B

G
G
B
G
B
B
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Table 4: Empirical Results
This table reports statistics from the posterior distributions of estimated parameters of the choice model (eqn 13).
Data are survey responses of 2003 participants collected in December 2014. Variables are defined in Table 2. For
each parameter, we report the mode of its posterior distribution as well as the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of this
distribution, i.e., the equi-tailed credible interval (CI). There is a 95% probability that the parameter is not zero if
zero does not fall in the CI. Estimation was conducted using SABL; see Appendix B for details.

Prior belief about adviser, Eq. (4)
Trust in financial advisers

Mode

2.5 Percentile

97.5 Percentile

0.520

0.421

0.610

Displays NO credential

-0.085

-0.199

-0.009

Constant

1.728

1.511

1.903

4.296

3.599

5.060

2.510

1.494

3.622

Choice of Advice, Eqs. (5) & (6)
Quality ( β1 )
Posterior belief ( β 2 )
Willingness to pay, Eq. (7)
Constant

-7.782

-9.687

-6.228

Price

-0.085

-0.124

-0.043

Posterior

18.309
0.466

14.808
0.348

22.230
0.570

Household income

0.094

-0.021

0.163

Confidence in financial decisions

-0.088

-0.186

0.051

Financial risk tolerance

0.055

-0.047

0.156

Decision maker

0.034

-0.125

0.186
-0.185

Paid for advice

Rational vs FHJ updating, Eq. (9)
Constant

-0.454

-0.994

High Conscientiousness

0.243

-0.046

0.485

High Impulsiveness

-0.344

-0.724

-0.154

Clarity of Topics, Eq. (10)
High Market Experience

0.073

-0.046.

0.151

High Product Knowledge

0.267

0.171

0.358

Participant older than 39

0.554

0.441

0.646

Participant female

0.138

0.053

0.237

High Financial Literacy

0.372

0.244

0.458

High Numeracy

0.357

0.278

0.482

Consolidation

1.405

1.148

1.632

Diversification

0.615

0.395

0.814

Fees

-0.545

-0.794

-0.358

Debt

1.768
1.511
1.995
Estimated % of participants using rational learning: 37.11; limited memory learning: 62.89.
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Table 5: Proportion of participants in latent classes of clear and ambiguous advice topics.
This table shows estimated posterior proportion of participants assigned to 16 latent classes differentiated by clarity
or ambiguity of the four advice topics: account consolidation (column 1), diversification (column 2), index fund fees
(column 3), and debt (column 4). A “1” indicates that participants in that class treated the topic as clear and “0”
indicates that they treat the topic as ambiguous. For example, the model assigns 18.2% of participants to latent class
1 (row 1) that treats all topics as clear, and assigns 3.8% of participants to latent class 16 (row 16) that treats all
topics as ambiguous. We infer latent classes from estimation of the choice model (eqn 13) – see Table 4 for
estimation results.
Latent class

Consolidation

Diversification

Fees

Debt

Segment Size

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0

1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0

1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0

18.2
2.2
21.9
4.5
6.9
1.4
14.0
4.8
3.1
0.6
6.4
2.3
2.0
0.7
7.2
3.8
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Table 6: Evolution of beliefs with one clear and three ambiguous topics.
This table compares the effects of first impressions on subsequent choices when clients use either rational (standard
Bayesian) or FHJ (limited memory) to update beliefs about adviser quality. The example assumes client A uses
rational updating and client B uses FHJ updating, that both clients are initially distrusting of financial advisers, and
that otherwise both clients have characteristics at the medians of the sample distributions. Parameters are set to the
modes of the posterior distributions. Adviser R shows a professional certification and Adviser L does not. Both
participants thus have the same prior beliefs that the right (R) and the left (L) adviser are of good quality, λ0.
Adviser R delivers good advice on a clear topic at choice 1 but topics 2-4 are ambiguous to both clients. Both clients
update their beliefs in the same way at the first choice because they get clear information about adviser quality λ1.
Client A’s beliefs about the advisers (λ2 − λ4 ) , and choice probabilities,
=
Pr( y2 1)=
to Pr( y4 1) , remain
constant because the rational client does not update using ambiguous signals. Client B treats ambiguous information
as evidence in favor of his or her priors and continues to update in favor of Adviser R.

λ0

Pr( y1 = 1)

λ1

Pr( y2 = 1)

Adviser R,
client A

0.785

0.987

0.916

0.886

0.916

0. 886

0.916

0. 886

0.916

Adviser R,
client B

0.785

0.987

0.916

0.886

0.970

0.913

0.990

0.921

0.997

Adviser L,
client A

0.755

0.013

0.098

0.114

0.098

0. 114

0.098

0. 114

0.098

Adviser L,
client B

0.755

0.013

0.098

0.114

0.035

0.087

0.012

0.079

0.004

Pr( y3 = 1)

λ3

λi = prior belief about adviser quality at choice set i ;
Pr( y=
1)=
i

probability of choosing to follow advice of adviser at choice set i

Pr( y4 = 1)

λ4
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Figure 1: Simulation of belief updating
This figure illustrates all possible paths of beliefs about the probability that an adviser is of good quality for experimental “clients” under different assumptions
about initial prior probabilities of good quality and updating strategies (in rows). Larger dots indicate a higher proportion of all possible updating paths that pass
through each point. We set the probability that a good adviser offers a good signal, s, to 0.75. Rows 1, 3 and 4 reflect limited memory (FHJ or “Fryer”) updating
with starting priors λ0 of 0.6, 0.5, and 0.4, respectively. Row 2 reflects rational updating where prior λ0 = 0.5. Columns 1-5 show belief paths where 4, 3, 2, 1, and
0 advice topics are clear to clients. At column 1 (all topics clear), difference between paths come from different sequences of good and bad advice. As more
topics become ambiguous difference between paths additionally come from different sequences of clear and ambiguous signals. FHJ updating leads to increasing
polarization. Rational clients do not update their priors if all signals are ambiguous (column 5, row 2). FHJ updaters also do not update when all signals are
ambiguous and their starting prior is equal to 0.5 (row 3, column 5).
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Figure 2: Discontinuities in likelihood function under FHJ updating

This figure shows proportion of theoretical belief paths reaching updated prior beliefs, λ4, after four signals from advisers to experimental clients who use either
rational or FHJ (“Fryer”) updating. Rows show simulations for three arbitrary values of the signal strength parameter s, that is, the probability that a good adviser
delivers good advice. For each value of the initial prior belief that an adviser is good, λ0 (horizontal axes), we draw all possible values of posterior beliefs that an
adviser is good after four signals, λ4 (vertical axes), supported by the model. Paths vary by the pattern of clear or ambiguous signals delivered by the adviser.
Larger circles indicate that more possible paths lead to any specific value of λ4. For example, in row 1 and column 2, at a signal strength of s=0.75 and where all
participants use FHJ updating, as λ0 moves from 0.49 to 0.51, λ4 jumps from mostly less than 0.1, to mostly larger than 0.8, creating a discontinuous likelihood
function.
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Figure 3: Advisers
This figure shows screen shots of four “advisers” who delivered video advice in the experiment. Each participant in
the experiment viewed advice delivered by two of the four advisers as matched pairs of gender, age and certification
opposites (e.g., young, male, certified v. older, female, not certified).
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Appendix A: Demographics – comparisons between survey sample and Australian population (18-79 years), 2011 Census.
This table compares demographics of sample of 2003 participants drawn from a nationally representative online panel by email invitation in 2014 with 2011
(most recent) Australian census.

Survey
Participant
Sample

18-79 yrs
Australian
Population

Gender
Male

50%

49%

Female

50%

51%

Survey
Participant
Sample

18-79 yrs
Australian
Population

Marital Status
Never Married

26%

30%

Divorced/ Separated

10%

13%

2%

3%

Widowed

Age
18-24 years

8%

10%

Married or long term relationship

62%

54%

25-29 years

8%

10%

30-34 years

12%

10%

Personal Income
$1-$20,799 (i.e. less than $399 a week)

24%

25%

35-39 years

12%

10%

$20,800-$51,999 (i.e. $400-$999 a week)

35%

32%

40-44 years

12%

10%

$52,000-$103,999 (i.e. $1,000-$1,999 a week)

25%

23%

45-49 years

9%

10%

$101,000 (i.e. $2,000 a week) or more

7%

7%

50-54 years

12%

10%

Negative or Nil Income

9%

6%

55-59 years

12%

9%

Not Started

0%

7%

60-64 years

13%

8%

65-69 years

2%

6%

Highest Level of Education
High School or Less

26%

40%

70-79 years

0%

8%

Vocational/Technical certificate

21%

20%

Tertiary diploma

11%

9%

Bachelor degree

23%

15%

Graduate certificate, diploma or degree

19%

6%

0%

10%

Work Status
Employed

62%

63%

Unemployed

8%

3%

Not in the labour force

18%

29%

Retired

12%

not broken out

0%

5%

Not stated

Not stated
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Appendix B: Sequential Adaptive Bayesian Learning Estimation
The discontinuities in the likelihood function of our model cause implementation
problems due to the inherent computational difficulty for maximum likelihood estimators (see
also Chernozhukov and Hong 2004). We overcome these difficulties with Bayesian estimation
methods. More specifically, we use Sequential Adaptive Bayesian Learning (SABL) proposed by
Durham and Geweke (2014). SABL is an extension of sequential Monte Carlo methods that
additionally exploits the benefits of parallel computing environments. SABL does not require
the modeler to specify conjugate priors and it is also robust to multimodal posteriors which can
arise in high dimensional problems (Jasra et al. 2007) such as ours. When used for Bayesian
inference, SABL is a posterior simulator. Our interest only lies in the latter; thus we focus the
following basic description of SABL on this while also ignoring the aspects that make SABL an
efficient tool to address very complex problems.
As with any Bayesian estimation approach SABL requires the user to specify the
likelihood function l (θ ) as well as prior distributions p (0) (θ ) for the parameters to be estimated.
SABL then produces draws from the posterior p* (θ ) as follows:
•

Draw parameters from the prior distributions. To do this SABL

(0)
(θ ) , organized into H groups 10 of G
represents initial information by θ g(0)
h ~ iid p

draws each (SABL defaults to H=16 and G=192). Let p (0) (θ ) be a very flat
version of the likelihood function, i.e. p (0) (θ ) = l (θ ) r0 with r0 very small.
•

10

For a sequence of cycles n=1, 2,..

SABL organizes the draws into groups to exploit the parallel processing possibilities of the algorithm.
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a.

Correction (C) phase: Determine p ( n ) (θ ) by raising the

likelihood function to a higher power, i.e. p ( n ) (θ ) = l (θ ) rn with rn > rn −1 .
Calculate for each draw a weight w( n ) (θ gh( n −1) ) = p ( n ) (θ gh( n −1) ) / p ( n −1) (θ gh( n −1) ) ,
h=1,…,H, g=1,…,G;
b.

Selection (S) phase, applied independently to each group

h=1,..,H: Use multinomial residual resampling (e.g. Douc and Cappé
( n ,0)
, g = 1,..., G} out of
2005) based on {w( n ) (θ gh ), g = 1,.., G} to select {θ gh

{θ gh( n −1) , i = 1,..., I } .
c.

Mutation (M) phase, applied independently to each group

h=1,..,H: The M phase is a Metropolis random walk. In each step o (o>0)
( n , o )*
of the random walk obtain for each g=1,…,G a proposal θ gh
is drawn

from N (θ gh( n ,o −1) , Σ ( n ,o −1) ) , where Σ ( n ,o−1) is proportional to the sample
( n ,o )
, g = 1,..., G} . Accept θ gh( n ,o )* with
variance of the particles {θ gh

probability α where α is defined as

α = min{1, p (0) (θ gh( n ,o )* )l (θ gh( n ,o )* ) / p (0) (θ gh( n ,o −1) )l (θ gh( n ,o −1) )} and set
θ gh( n ,o ) = θ gh( n ,o )* , otherwise set θ gh( n ,o ) = θ gh( n ,o −1) . The proportionality factor is
thereby increased when the rate of accepting the proposal draws is higher
than a particular threshold (the default in SABL is 0.25), and decreases
otherwise. The random walk terminates once the dependence among
particles has been sufficiently broken, that is when the particles are
sufficiently independent (note that the S-phase introduces dependence via
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( n −1)
repeated sampling of the same θ gh
). SABL assumes sufficient

independence of the particles when the variance (calculated across the H
( n ,o )
group means) falls below a certain threshold. The last set of θ gh
is then
(n)
denoted as θ gh
.

•

If p ( n ) (θ ) = l (θ ) then N=n and the algorithm terminates with draws

θ gh( N ) from the posterior distribution p* (θ ) .

We chose uninformative priors. We assumed that the prior for each parameter of interest
is independent normal with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of five. We evaluated the
sensitivity of prior influence by a careful visual examination of the posterior distribution against
the prior distribution.
The advantage of using SABL (or a Bayesian approach in general) is that the posterior
distribution of draws can help in assessing the identification of the model parameters (see also
discussion in the previous section). More specifically, a high correlation between the posterior
draws of two parameters may suggest that these are not separately identified by the choice data.
In addition to including different covariates in the different model parts (see also discussion in
section 4) and specifying different uninformative priors, we used this correlation matrix check to
further assess the identification of our model. 11

11

We run SABL using its MATLAB interface. SABL itself can be downloaded from
http://www.quantosanalytics.org/garland/mp-sps_1.1.zip. The time to estimate our model using SABL is
approximately 60 minutes.

